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HIGH TECHNOLOGY, CONSUMER PRIVACY,
AND U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY
Laura K. Donohue *

I. INTRODUCTION
Documents released over the past year detailing the National Security Agency’s
(“NSA”) telephony metadata collection program and interception of international
content under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) implicated U.S.
high technology companies in government surveillance. 1 The result was an
immediate, and detrimental, impact on U.S. corporations, the economy, and U.S.
national security.
The first Snowden documents, printed on June 5, 2013, revealed that the
government had served orders on Verizon, directing the company to turn over
telephony metadata under Section 215 of the USA PATRIOT Act. 2 The following
day, The Guardian published classified slides detailing how the NSA had
intercepted international content under Section 702 of the FISA Amendments Act. 3
The type of information obtained ranged from E-mail, video and voice chat,
videos, photos, and stored data, to Voice over Internet Protocol, file transfers,
video conferencing, notifications of target activity, and online social networking. 4
The companies involved read like a who’s who of U.S. Internet giants: Microsoft,
Yahoo, Google, Facebook, PalTalk, YouTube, Skype, AOL, and Apple. 5
*
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“Cross Border Data Flows: Could Foreign Protectionism Hurt U.S. Jobs?” Sept. 17, 2014.
1 See, e.g., Glenn Greenwald and Ewen MacAskill, NSA Prism Program Taps in to User Data of
Apple, Google, and Others, THE GUARDIAN (June 7, 2013, 3:23 PM),
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/06/us-tech-giants-nsa-data; Barton Gellman and Laura
Poitras, U.S., British Intelligence Mining Data from Nine U.S. Internet Companies in Broad Secret
Program, WASH. POST (June 7, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/investigations/usintelligence-mining-data-from-nine-us-internet-companies-in-broad-secretprogram/2013/06/06/3a0c0da8-cebf-11e2-8845-d970ccb04497_story.html?hpid=z1; Glenn
Greenwald, NSA Collecting Phone Records of Millions of Verizon Customers Daily, THE GUARDIAN,
(June 6, 2013, 8:05 PM), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/06/nsa-phone-records-verizoncourt-order [herenafter Greenwald, NSA Collected Verizon Records]; Glenn Greenwald, Microsoft
Handed the NSA Access to Encrypted Messages, THE GUARDIAN, (July 12, 2013, 5:04 PM),
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jul/11/microsoft-nsa-collaboration-user-data; Barton
Gellman & Ashkan Soltani, NSA Infiltrates Links to Yahoo, Google Data Centers Worldwide,
Snowden Documents Say, WASH. POST, Oct. 30, 2013,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/nsa-infiltrates-links-to-yahoo-google-datacenters-worldwide-snowden-documents-say/2013/10/30/e51d661e-4166-11c3-8b74d89d714ca4dd_story.html. For statutory and constitutional analysis of the telephony metadata
program and the interception of international content, see Laura K. Donohue, Bulk Metadata
Collection: Statutory and Constitutional Considerations, 37 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 757 (2014)
[hereinafter Donohue, Bulk Metadata Collection],; Laura K. Donohue, Section 702 and the
Collection of International Telephone and Internet Content, 38 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y,
(forthcoming 2015) [hereinafter Donohue, Section 702).
2 Greenwald, NSA Collecting Phone Records, supra note 1.
3 Greenwald & MacAskill, supra note 1.
4 Id.
5 Id.
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More articles highlighting the extent to which the NSA had become embedded
in the U.S. high tech industry followed. In September 2013 ProPublica and the
New York Times revealed that the NSA had enjoyed considerable success in
cracking commonly used cryptography. 6 The following month the Washington
Post reported that the NSA, without the consent of the companies involved, had
obtained millions of customers’ address book data. In one day alone, some
444,743 email addresses from Yahoo, 105,068 from Hotmail, 82,857 from
Facebook, 33,697 from Gmail, and 22,881 from other providers. 7
The extent of upstream collection stunned the public, as did slides
demonstrating how the NSA had bypassed the companies’ encryption, intercepting
data as it transferred between the public Internet and the Google cloud. 8
Documents further suggested that the NSA had helped to promote encryption
standards for which it already held the key or whose vulnerabilities the agency
understood but had not taken steps to address. 9
Beyond this, press reports indicated that the NSA had at times posed as U.S.
companies—without their knowledge—in order to gain access to foreign targets.
In November 2013 Der Spiegel reported that the NSA and the United Kingdom’s
Government Communications Headquarters (“GCHQ”) had created bogus versions
of Slashdot and LinkedIn, so that when employees from the telecommunications
firm Belgacom tried to access the sites from corporate computers, their requests
were diverted to the replica sites that then injected malware into their machines.10
As a result of the growing public awareness of these programs, U.S. companies
have lost revenues, even as non-U.S. firms have benefited. 11 In addition,
6

Nicole Perlroth, et al., N.S.A. Able to Foil Basic Safeguards of Privacy on Web, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 5,
2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/06/us/nsa-foils-much-internetencryption.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0.
7 Barton Gellman & Ashkan Soltani, NSA Collects Millions of E-mail Address Books Globally,
WASH. POST, Oct. 14, 2013, http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/nsa-collectsmillions-of-e-mail-address-books-globally/2013/10/14/8e58b5be-34f9-11e3-80c67e6dd8d22d8f_story.html.
8 Gellman & Soltani, supra note 1.
9 James Ball, et al., Revealed: How US and UK Spy Agencies Defeat Internet Privacy and Security,
THE GUARDIAN (Sept. 6, 2013, 8:24 PM), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/sep/05/nsa-gchqencryption-codes-security.
10 Steven Levy, How the NSA Almost Killed the Internet, WIRED (Jan. 7, 2014, 6:30 AM),
http://www.wired.com/2014/01/how-the-us-almost-killed-the-internet/all/.
11 See, e.g., Sam Gustin, NSA Spying Scandal Could Cost U.S. Tech Giants Billions, TIME (Dec. 10,
2013), http://business.time.com/2013/12/10/nsa-spying-scandal-could-cost-u-s-tech-giants-billions/
(“The National Security Agency spying scandal could cost the top U.S. tech companies billions of
dollars over the next several years, according to industry experts. In addition to consumer Internet
companies, hardware and cloud-storage giants like IBM, Hewlett-Packard, and Oracle could suffer
billions of dollars in losses.”); Ellen Messmer, U.S. High-Tech Industry Feeling the Heat from
Edward Snowden Leaks, NETWORKWORLD, (July 19, 2013, 3:44 PM),
http://www.networkworld.com/article/2168328/security/u-s--high-tech-industry-feeling-the-heatfrom-edward-snowden-leaks.html (“The disclosures about the National Security Agency’s massive
global surveillance by Edward Snowden, the former information-technology contractor who’s now
wanted by the U.S. government for treason, is hitting the U.S. high-tech industry hard as it tries to
explain its involvement in the NSA data-collection program.”); Claire Cain Miller, Revelations of
N.S.A. Spying Cost U.S. Tech Companies, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 21, 2014,
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/22/business/fallout-from-snowden-hurting-bottom-line-of-techcompanies.html?_r=0 (writing, “Despite the tech companies’ assertions that they provide
information on their customers only when required under law – and not knowingly through a back
door – the perception that they enabled the spying program has lingered.”); Surveillance Costs: The
NSA’s Impact on the Economy, Internet Freedom & Cybersecurity, NEW AMERICA’S OPEN TECH.
INST. 2 (July 2014), http://oti.newamerica.net/sites/newamerica.net/files/policydocs/Surveilance
_Costs_Final.pdf (“American companies have reported declining sales overseas and lost business
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numerous countries, concerned about consumer privacy as well as the penetration
of U.S. surveillance efforts in the economic and political spheres, have accelerated
data localization initiatives, begun restricting U.S. companies’ access to local
markets, and introduced new privacy protections, with implications for the future
of Internet governance and U.S. economic growth. These effects raise attendant
concerns about U.S. national security.
It could be argued that some of these effects, such as data localization
initiatives, are merely opportunistic—i.e., other countries are merely using the
NSA revelations to advance national commercial and political interests. 12 Even if
true, however, the NSA programs provide other countries with an opportunity.
They have weakened the U.S. hand in the international arena.
Congress has the ability to redress the current situation. First, and most
importantly, reform of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act would provide for
greater restrictions on NSA surveillance. Second, new domestic legislation could
extend better protections to consumer privacy. These shifts would allow U.S.
industry legitimately to claim a change in circumstance, which would help them to
gain competitive ground. Third, the integration of economic concerns at a
programmatic level within the national security infrastructure would help to ensure
that economic matters remain central to national security determinations in the
future.
II. ECONOMIC IMPACT OF NSA PROGRAMS
The NSA programs, and public awareness of them, have had an immediate and
detrimental impact on the U.S. economy. They have cost U.S. companies billions
of dollars in lost sales, even as companies have seen their market shares decline.
American multinational corporations have had to develop new products and
programs to offset the revelations and to build consumer confidence. At the same
time, foreign entities have seen revenues increase. Beyond the immediate impact,
the revelation of the programs, and the extent to which the NSA has penetrated
foreign data flows, has undermined U.S. trade agreement negotiations. It has
spurred data localization efforts around the world, and it has raised the spectre of
the future role of the United States in Internet governance. Even if opportunistic,
these shifts signal an immediate and long-term impact of the NSA programs, and
public knowledge about them, on the U.S. economy.
A. Lost Revenues and Declining Market Share
Billions of dollars are on the line because of worldwide concern that the
services provided by U.S. information technology companies are neither secure nor
private. 13 Perhaps nowhere is this more apparent than in cloud computing.

opportunities, especially as foreign companies turn claims for products that can protect users from
NSA spying into a competitive advantage.”).
12 See, e.g., Jonah Force Hill, The Growth of Data Localization Post-Snowden: Analyses and
Recommendations for U.S. Policymakers and Industry Leaders, Lawfare Research Paper Series, July
21, 2014 (arguing that protectionism, domestic surveillance and law enforcement, control of
information and censorship, and populist politics and anti-globalization, and not the NSA programs,
serve as the underlying motivation).
13 IT Industries Set to Lose Billions Because of Privacy Concerns, UNITED PRESS INT’L, (Dec. 17,
2013, 9:20 PM), http://www.upi.com/Business_News/Security-Industry/2013/12/17/IT-industriesset-to-lose-billions-because-of-privacy-concerns/UPI-30251387333206/ (“Information technology
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Previously, approximately 50% of the worldwide cloud computing revenues
derived from the United States. 14 The domestic market thrived: between 2008 and
2014, it more than tripled in value. 15 But within weeks of the Snowden leaks,
reports had emerged that U.S. companies such as Dropbox, Amazon Web Services,
and Microsoft’s Azure were losing business. 16 By December 2013, ten percent of
the Cloud Security Alliance had cancelled U.S. cloud services projects as a result
of the Snowden information. 17 In January 2014 a survey of Canadian and British
businesses found that one quarter of the respondents were moving their data
outside the United States. 18
The Information Technology and Innovation Foundation estimates that
declining revenues of corporations that focus on cloud computing and data storage
alone could reach $35 billion over the next three years. 19 Other commentators,
such as Forrester Research analyst James Staten, have put actual losses as high as
$180 billion by 2016, unless something is done to restore confidence in data held
by U.S. companies. 20
The monetary impact of the NSA programs extends beyond cloud computing
to the high technology industry. Cisco, Qualcomm, IBM, Microsoft, and HewlettPackard have all reported declining sales as a direct result of the NSA programs. 21
Servint, a webhosting company based in Virginia, reported in June 2014 that its
international clients had dropped by 50% since the leaks began. 22 Also in June, the
German government announced that because of Verizon’s complicity in the NSA
program, it would end its contract with the company, which had previously

companies stand to lose billions of dollars of business because of concerns their services are neither
secure nor private.”).
14 Gartner Predict Cloud Computing Spending to Increase by 100% in 2016, Says AppsCare, PRWEB
(July 19, 2012), http://www.prweb.com/releases/2012/7/prweb9711167.htm.
15 Id.
16 David Gilbert, Companies Turn to Switzerland for Cloud Storage Following NSA Spying
Revelations, INT’L BUS. TIMES, (July 4, 2013, 2:33 PM), http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/business-turnsaway-dropbox-towards-switzerland-nsa-486613.
17 Mieke Eoyang & Gabriel Horwitz, Op-Ed., NSA Snooping’s Negative Impact on Business Would
Have the Founding Fathers ‘Aghast,’ FORBES,(Dec. 20, 2013, 8:00 AM),
http://snewsi.com/id/1342616710/NSA-Snoopings-Negative-Impact-On-Business-Would-Have-TheFounding-Fathers-Aghast.
18 NSA Scandal: UK and Canadian Business Wary of Storing Data in the US, PEER 1 HOSTING, (Jan.
8, 2014), http://www.peer1.com/news-update/nsa-scandal-uk-and-canadian-businesses-wary-storingdata-in-us.
19 Id.; see also Mary DeRosa, U.S. Cloud Services Companies Are Paying Dearly for NSA Leaks,
NEXTGOV (Mar. 24, 2014), http://www.nextgov.com/technology-news/tech-insider/2014/03/us-cloudservices-companies-are-paying-dearly-nsa-leaks/81100/ (reporting estimates of losses of $22 billion
over the next three years).
20 IT Industries Set to Lose Billions Because of Privacy Concerns, supra note 12. This number
includes domestic customers who may go elsewhere to find greater privacy protections. See Gustin,
supra note 11.
21 Sean Gallagher, NSA Leaks Blamed for Cisco’s Falling Sales Overseas (Updated), ARS TECHNICA,
(Dec. 11, 2013, 5:05 AM), http://www.arstechnica.com/information-technology/2013/12/nsa-leaksblamed-for-ciscos-failing-sales-overseas/; Paul Taylor, Cisco Warns Emerging Market Weakness is
no Blip, FIN. TIMES, (Dec. 13, 2013, 12:07 AM), http:www/ft/com/intl/cms/s/0/fb757c4e-637b-11e3a87d-00144feabdc0.html#axzz3ILJr30Gr; Spencer E. Ante, Qualcomm CEO Says NSA Fallout
Impacting China Business, WALL. ST. J., Nov. 22, 2013,
http://www.online.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702304337404579214353783842062; Miller,
supra note 11.
22 Julian Hattem, Tech Takes Hit from NSA, THE HILL (June 30, 2014, 6:00 AM),
http://thehill.com/policy/technology/210880-tech-takes-hit-from-nsa.
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provided services to a number of government departments.23 As a senior analyst at
the Information Technology and Innovation Foundation explained, “It’s clear to
every single tech company that this is affecting their bottom line.”24 The European
commissioner for digital affairs, Neelie Kroes, predicts that the fallout for U.S.
businesses in the EU alone will amount to billions of Euros. 25
Not only are U.S. companies losing customers, but they have been forced to
spend billions to add encryption features to their services. IBM has invested more
than a billion dollars to build data centers in London, Hong Kong, Sydney, and
elsewhere, in an effort to reassure consumers outside the United States that their
information is protected from U.S. government surveillance. 26 Salesforce.com
made a similar announcement in March 2014. 27 Google moved to encrypt terms
entered into its browser. 28 In June 2014 it took the additional step of releasing the
source code for End-to-End, its newly-developed browser plugin that allows users
to encrypt email prior to it being sent across the Internet. 29 The following month
Microsoft announced Transport Layer Security for inbound and outbound email,
and Perfect Forward Secrecy encryption for access to OneDrive. 30 Together with
the establishment of a Transparency Center, where foreign governments could
review source code to assure themselves of the integrity of Microsoft software, the
company sought to put an end to both NSA back door surveillance and doubt about
the integrity of Microsoft products. 31
Foreign technology companies, in turn, are seeing revenues increase. Runbox,
for instance, an email service based in Norway and a direct competitor to Gmail
and Yahoo, almost immediately made it publicly clear that it does not comply with
foreign court requests for its customers’ personal information. 32 Its customer base
increased 34% in the aftermath of the Snowden leaks. 33 Mateo Meier, CEO of
Artmotion, Switzerland’s biggest offshore data hosting company, reported that
within the first month of the leaks, the company saw a 45% rise in revenue. 34
Because Switzerland is not a member of the EU, the only way to access data in a
Swiss data center is through an official court order demonstrating guilt or liability;
there are no exceptions for the United States. 35 In April 2014, Brazil and the EU,
which previously used U.S. firms to supply undersea cables for transoceanic
23

Andrea Peterson, German Government to Drop Verizon over NSA Spying Fears, WASH. POST, June
26, 2014, http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-switch/wp/2014/06/26/german-government-todrop-verizon-over-nsa-spying-fears/.
24 Id.
25 Eoyang & Horwirz, supra note 17.
26 Miller, supra note 11.
27 Id.
28 Danny Sullivan, Post-PRISM, Google Confirms Quietly Moving to Make All Searches Secure,
Except for Ad Clicks, SEARCH ENGINE LAND (Sept. 23, 2013, 11:53 AM)
http://searchengineland.com/post-prism-google-secure-searches-172487.
29 Klint Finley, Google Renews Battle with the NSA by Open Sourcing Email Encryption Tool, WIRED
(June 3, 2014, 7:41 PM), http://www.wired.com/2014/06/end-to-end/.
30 Matt Thomlinson, Advancing our Encryption and Transparency Efforts, MICROSOFT (July 1, 2014),
http://blogs.microsoft.com/on-the-issues/2014/07/01/advancing-our-encryption-and-transparencyefforts/; see also Carly Page, Microsoft Installs Tougher Outlook and Onedrive Encryption to Curb
NSA Snooping, THE INQUIRER, (July 1, 2014, 3:36 PM),
http://www.theinquirer.net/inquirer/news/2353073/microsoft-installs-better-outlook-and-onedriveencryption-to-curb-nsa-snooping.
31 Thomlinson, supra note 29.
32 Miller, supra note 11.
33 Id.
34 Gilbert, supra note 16.
35 Id.
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communications, decided to build their own cables between Brazil and Portugal,
using Spanish and Brazilian companies in the process. 36 OpenText, Canada’s
largest software company, now guarantees customers that their data remains
outside the United States. Deutsche Telekom, a cloud computing provider, is
similarly gaining more customers. 37 Numerous foreign companies are marketing
their products as “NSA proof” or “safer alternatives” to those offered by U.S.
firms, gaining market share in the process. 38
B. Trade Agreements
The NSA programs, and media coverage of them, have further impacted biand multi-lateral trade negotiations, undermining U.S. economic security.
Consider two of the most important talks currently underway: the Transatlantic
Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) and the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP).
TTIP is a trade and investment negotiation that is being conducted between the
European Commission and the United States. The purpose of the agreement is to
create better trade relations between the two region, enabling companies on both
sides of the Atlantic to thrive. The revelations about NSA activities have had a
profound impact on the negotiations.
In March 2014 the European Parliament passed a resolution noting “the impact
of mass surveillance.” It stated, “the revelations based on documents leaked by
former NSA contractor Edward Snowden put political leaders under the obligation
to address the challenges of overseeing and controlling intelligence agencies in
surveillance activities and assessing the impact of their activities on fundamental
rights and the rule of law in a democratic society.” 39 It recognized that the
programs had undermined “trust between the EU and the US as transatlantic
partners.” Not least were concerns that the information could be used for
“economic and industrial espionage”—and not merely for the purpose of heading
off potentially violent threats. Parliament strongly emphasized, “given the
importance of the digital economy in the relationship and in the cause of rebuilding
EU-US trust,” that its “consent to the final TTIP agreement could be endangered as
long as the blanket mass surveillance activities and the interception of
communications in EU institutions and diplomatic representations are not
completely abandoned and an adequate solution is found for the data privacy rights
of EU citizens.” The resolution underscored that any agreement to TTIP would
hinge on the protection of the data privacy rights as reflected in the protection of
fundamental rights in the EU Charter.40
Even if the surveillance programs do not entirely derail TTIP, they have the
potential to significantly retard negotiations. 41 Much is at stake. The Center for
Economic Policy Research in London, for instance, estimates that a successful
TTIP could improve U.S. workers’ wages, provide new jobs, and increase the
36

Miller, supra note 11.
Id.
38 Mark Scott, European Firms Turn Privacy into Sales Pitch, N. Y. TIMES, June 11, 2014,
http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2014/06/11/european-firms-turn-privacy-into-sales-pitch/.
39 European Parliament Resolution of March 12, 2014 on the NSA surveillance Programme,
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=TA&language=EN&reference=P7-TA-20140230.
40 Id.
41 See, e.g., Patrick Donahue and Arne Delfs, Germany Demands U.S. Honesty on Spying after
Expulsion, Bloomberg Business, July 11, 2014, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2014-0710/germany-kicks-out-u-s-spy-as-relations-decline-to-low.
37
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country’s GDP by $100 billion per year. 42 Another study, conducted by the
Bertelsmann Foundation, suggests that TTIP “could increase GDP per capita in the
United States by 13 percent over the long term.” 43 To the extent that the programs
weaken the U.S. position in the negotiations, the impact could be significant. 44
Although the United States Trade Representative is trying to counter the
political fallout from the NSA debacle by putting local data protection initiatives
on the table in the TTIP negotiations, the EU has steadfastly resisted any expansion
into this realm.
TPP, in turn, is a trade agreement that the United States is negotiating with 11
countries in the Asia-Pacific region (Australia, Brunei Darussalam, Canada, Chile,
Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Peru, Singapore, and Vietnam). TPP
(with participation of Japan), accounts for nearly 40% of global GDP, about 1/3 of
world trade. Two of the United States’ objectives in these negotiations are directly
implicated by the Snowden releases: e-commerce / telecommunications, and
intellectual property rights.
The NSA programs relate to a number of categories under e-commerce—such
as rules preventing discrimination based on the country of origin, and efforts to
construct a single, global Internet. Nevertheless, as discussed below, some of the
countries involved in TPP have already adopted data localization laws. The NSA
programs have thus weakened the United States’ negotiation position in these
discussions, by making it more difficult to reach agreement in key areas.
In addition to e-commerce considerations, as part of the TPP negotiations, the
United States has prioritized intellectual property rights. Some 40 million
American jobs are directly or indirectly tied to “IP-intensive” industries. These
jobs tend to be high-paying and stimulate approximately 60% of U.S. merchandise
exports, as well as a significant portion of services. Efforts to make progress in
TPP by developing stronger protections for patents, trademarks copyrights, and
trade secrets—including safeguards against cyber theft of trade secrets—is made
more perilous by the existence of the NSA programs.
C. Data Localization and Data Protection
Over the past eighteen months, countries around the world have increasingly
adopted data localization laws, restricting the storage, analysis, and transfer of
digital information to national borders. 45 To some extent, the use of barriers to
trade as a means of incubating tech-based industries predated the Snowden

42

William Schomberg and Roberta Rampton, Credit Markets: EU, U.S. leaders launch free-trade
talks, Reuters, June 17, 2013,
http://mobile.reuters.com/article/creditMarkets/idUSBRE95G0MD20130617.
43 William Schomberg and Roberta Rampton, Credit Markets: EU, U.S. leaders launch free-trade
talks, Reuters, June 17, 2013,
http://mobile.reuters.com/article/creditMarkets/idUSBRE95G0MD20130617. See also Bertlesmann
Foundation, Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP): Who benefits form a free trade
deal?, Part 1: Macroeconomic Effects, http://www.bfna.org/sites/default/files/TTIPGED%20study%2017June%202013.pdf.
44 Even if NSA surveillance doesn’t derail the TTIP, it could certainly slow it down. The Center for
Economic Policy Research in London predicts the TTIP would improve wages, provide new job
opportunities, and increase U.S. GDP by $127 billion per year. A study commissioned by
Bertelsmann Foundation says the TTIP “could
45 Jonah Force Hill, The Growth of Data Localization Post-Snowden: Analysis and
Recommendations for U.S. Policymakers and Industry Leaders, (July 21, 2014) (unpublished
manuscript) (on file with the Lawfare Research Paper Series).
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releases. 46 In the aftermath of the leaks, the dialogue has gained momentum. The
asserted purpose is to protect government data and consumer privacy.
As of the time of writing, China, Greece, Malaysia, Russia, South Korea,
Venezuela, Vietnam, Iran, and others have already implemented local data server
requirements. 47 Turkey has introduced new privacy regulations preventing the
transfer of personal data (particularly locational data) overseas.48 Others, such as
Argentina, India, and Indonesia are actively considering new laws, even as
Brazilian president, Dilma Rousseff, has been promoting a law that would require
citizens’ personal data to be stored within domestic bounds. 49 Germany and
France are considering a Schengen routing system, retaining as much online data
in the European Union as possible. 50
As a regional matter, the European Union (EU) Commission’s Vice President,
Viviane Reding, is pushing for Europe to adopt more expansive privacy laws. 51 In
March 2014, the European Parliament passed the Data Protection Regulation and
Directive, imposing strict limits on the handling of EU citizens’ data.52 Reding
announced, “The message the European Parliament is sending is unequivocal:
This reform is a necessity, and now it is irreversible. Europe’s directly elected
parliamentarians have listened to European citizens and European businesses and,
with this vote, have made clear that we need a uniform and strong European data
protection law, which will. . . strengthen the protection of our citizens.” 53
Regardless of where the information is based, those handling the data must obtain
the consent of the data subjects to having their personal information processed.
They also retain the right to later withdraw consent. Those violating the directive
face steep fines, including up to five percent of revenues.54 Apart from the new
directive, the Civil Liberties, Justice, and Home Affairs Committee of the
European Parliament passed a resolution calling for the end of the US/EU Safe

46

See, e.g., Stephen J. Ezell, el al., Localization Barriers to Trade: Threat to the Global Innovation
Economy, (Sept. 25 2013) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the Information Technology &
Innovation Foundation).
47 Heads Up for Privacy, Data Protection and Cybersecurity in 2014, SIDLEY AUSTIN LLP (Dec. 30,
2013) http://m.sidley.com/ring-in-the-new-things-to-watch-in-2014-12-23-2013/; The National
Information Network, International Campaign for Human Rights in Iran, Nov. 10, 2014,
http://www.iranhumanrights.org/2014/11/internet-reportthe-national-information-network-nationalinternet/.
48 Richard Chirgwin, USA Opposes ‘Schengen Cloud’ Eurocentric Routing Plan, THE REGISTER (Apr.
7, 2014, 12:58 AM),
http://www.theregister.co.uk/2014/04/07/keeping_data_away_from_the_us_not_on_ustr/.
49 Levy, supra note 10.
50 See, e.g., Jeanette Seiffert, Weighing a Schengen Zone for Europe’s Internet Data, DEUTSCHE
WELLE (Feb. 20, 2014), http://www.dw.de/weighing-a-schengen-zone-for-europes-internet-data/a17443482 ; Interview by Louisa Schaefer with Philipp Blank, Spokesperson, Deutsche Telekom (Oct.
18, 2013), available at http://www.dw.de/deutsche-telekom-internet-data-made-in-germany-shouldstay-in-germany/a-17165891.
51 Eoyang & Horwitz, supra note 16.
52 European Parliament legislative resolution of 12 March 2014 on the proposal for a regulation of the
European Parliament and of the Council on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing
of personal data and on the free movement of such data (General Data Protection Regulation
(COM(2012)0011 – C7-0025/2012 – 2012/0011(COD)), available at:
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+TA+P7-TA-20140212+0+DOC+XML+V0//EN; European Commission Press Release, Progress on EU Data
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Harbor agreement. 55 Some 3000 U.S. companies rely on this framework to
conduct business with the EU. 56
In May 2014, the EU Court of Justice ruled that users have a “right to be
forgotten” in their use of online search engines. 57 The case derived from a
complaint lodged against a Spanish newspaper, as well as Google Spain and
Google Inc., claiming that notice of the plaintiff’s repossessed home on Google’s
search engine infringed his right to privacy because the incident had been fully
addressed years before. He requested that the newspaper be required to remove or
alter the pages in question to excise data related to him, and that Google Spain or
Google Inc. be required to remove the information. 58
The EU court found that even where the physical server of a company
processing information is not located in Europe, as long as the company has a
branch or subsidiary and is doing business in a Member state, the 1995 Data
Protection Directive applies. 59 Because search engines contain personal data, they
are subject to such data protection laws. The court recognized that, under certain
conditions, individuals have the “right to be forgotten”—i.e., the right to request
that search engines remove links containing personal information. Data that is
inaccurate, inadequate, irrelevant, or excessive may be removed. Not absolute, the
right to be forgotten must be weighed against competing rights, such as freedom of
expression and the media. 60
Various country-specific privacy laws are similarly poised to be introduced.
Their potential economic impact is substantial. The Information Technology and
Innovation Fund estimates that data privacy rules could retard the growth of the
technology industry by up to four percent, impacting U.S. companies’ ability to
expand and forcing them out of existing markets. 61
The current dialogue is merely the latest in a series of growing concerns about
the absence of effective privacy protections within the U.S. legal regime. High
tech companies appear to see this as a concern. As Representative Justin Amash
(MI-R) has explained, “Businesses increasingly recognize that our government’s
out-of-control surveillance hurts their bottom line and costs American jobs. It
violates the privacy of their customers and it erodes American businesses’
competitive edge.” 62
It is with the impact of lack of privacy controls in the surveillance sphere on
U.S. competitiveness in mind that, in December 2013, some of the largest U.S.
Internet companies launched a campaign to pressure the government to reform the
NSA programs. Microsoft General Counsel Brad Smith explained: “People won’t
55
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58 See id.
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use technology they don’t trust.” He added, “Governments have put this trust at
risk, and governments need to help restore it.” 63 Numerous high technology CEOs
supported the initiative, such Google’s Larry Page, Yahoo’s Marissa Mayer, and
Facebook’s Mark Zuckerberg. 64 The aim is to limit government authority to
collect user data, to institute better oversight and accountability, to ensure greater
transparency about what the government is requesting (and obtaining), to increase
respect for the free flow of data across borders, and to avoid political clashes on a
global scale.
Mayer, explained, “Recent revelations about government
surveillance activities have shaken the trust of our users, and it is time for the
United States government to act to restore the confidence of citizens around the
world.” 65
D. Internet Governance
From the inception of the Internet, the U.S.-based Internet Corporation for
Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN) has governed the web. As time has
progressed, and the Internet has become part of the global infrastructure, there
have been calls from several nations to end U.S. dominance and to have the
International Telecommunication Union (ITU), an entity within the UN, become
the governing body. 66 The global backlash against the NSA programs raises
question about the future of Internet governance. The revelations have not only
contributed further to such calls, but they have spurred increased discussion of the
need for regional Internet control. 67
Over the past decade, three main groups have emerged to vie for control of the
Internet. The first is centered on states, who consider the question in light of
national sovereignty. It is comprised of developing countries as well as large,
emerging economies like China, Russia, Brazil, and South Africa. 68 It overlaps
significantly with the Group of 77 (consisting of more than 100 countries which
emerged from the non-aligned movement in the Cold War). These states are
critical of the United States and its dominant role in Internet governance and
oppose private sector preeminence, on the grounds that they are pawns of the
United States. 69 Emphasis instead is placed on the UN and the ITU as potential
repositories of Internet authority. The second group is civil society. The third is
the private sector. These groups tend to support what is referred to as a
“multistakeholder model:” i.e., native Internet governance institutions that are
generally nonprofit entities in the private sector. 70 Membership includes both
63
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technical experts (e.g., ICANN and Regional Internet Registries), as well as
multinational corporations (e.g., Microsoft, Facebook, and AT&T). Prior to the
Snowden releases, Japan, the EU, and the United States found themselves in this
camp. Civil society organizations emphasize Internet freedom, consumer privacy,
and user rights—often bringing them into conflict with the states who comprise the
G77-type group. 71 As one commentator explains, “This alignment of actors has
been in place since the 2003 World Summit on the Information Society (WSIS)
meetings. But the Snowden NSA revelations seem to have destabilized this settled
political alignment.” 72
In the wake of the Snowden documents, ICANN and Brazil have formed an
alliance, condemning U.S. actions. Concern about the latest revelations spurred a
major conference in April 2014, the Global Multistakeholder Conference on the
Future of Internet Governance. The purpose of the meeting, which was held in
Sao Paulo, was “to produce universal internet principles and an institutional
framework for multi-stakeholder Internet governance.” 73
It is not clear how the newest shifts will be resolved—either temporarily or in
the future. But significant questions have been raised: How should the Internet
governance be structured to ensure legitimacy and compliance? Who gets to make
the decision about what such governance looks like? Which bodies have the
authority to establish future rules and procedures? How are such bodies
constituted and who selects their membership?
These questions are fundamentally at odds with the decentralization tendencies
in the Internet—tendencies that have been exaggerated post-Snowden as a result of
regional efforts to expand the local sphere of influence and to protect consumer
and state privacy from U.S. surveillance.
The U.S. government’s failure to address the situation domestically has
undermined the tech industry. Despite calls from the companies for legislative
reform to address the breadth of the NSA programs, 74 there has been no significant
shift that would allow companies to approach their customers to say, with truth,
that the situation has changed. Resultantly, American companies are losing not
just customers, but also the opportunity to submit proposals for contracts for which
they previously would have been allowed to compete. 75 The future of Internet
governance hangs in the balance.
III. ECONOMIC SECURITY AS NATIONAL SECURITY
The NSA programs illustrate lawmakers’ failure to recognize the degree to which
economic strength is central to national security, as well as the importance of the
high technology industry to the U.S. economy.
The concept of economic security as national security is not new: the Framers
and the generations that followed acknowledged the importance of economic
strength as central to national security. Our more recent understandings, however,
have gotten away from the concept, in the process cleaving important interests out
of the calculations required to accurately understand the implications of
government actions. Unintended consequences have resulted. The Snowden
71
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leaks, for instance, may have driven bad actors to seek non-U.S. companies for ISP
services, creating gaps in insight into their operations. They have also undermined
U.S. efforts to call other countries to heel for their exploitation of international
communications to gain advantages over U.S. industry. In sum, the expansive
nature of the programs may well have acted to undermine U.S. national security in
myriad ways linked to the country’s economic interests.
A. Economic Security from the Founding
Despite its appearance throughout U.S. history, the term “national security” is
rarely defined in law. 76 The 1947 National Security Act, for instance, which, inter
alia, constituted the National Military Establishment (later the Department of
Defense), and the National Security Council, refers to “national security” more
than 100 times; yet, it does not define the term. 77 The Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act of 1978 employs the term nearly a dozen times, to ascertain what
matters fall within the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court’s purview, who can
certify an application to FISC, and under what conditions in camera and ex parte
proceedings can be held. 78 Where the Attorney General ascertains that a national
security threat exists, officials may secretly search and seize property—waiting
notice otherwise required under the Fourth Amendment. 79 But no definition is
provided in FISA. Nor does the USA PATRIOT Act prove more illuminating—
despite referring to national security more than two dozen times. 80
Definitions of national security that are found in the U.S. Code tend to limit
consideration to foreign affairs and matters related to military strength. 81 Under
the Classified Information Procedures Act, “national security” is understood as
involving matters related to the “national defense and foreign relations of the
United States.” 82 Nowhere does the definition reference U.S. economic security.
In the amended National Security Act, while the term could potentially be
understood to encompass U.S. economic security, the actual definition does not
specify a precise link to economic vitality. Instead, “intelligence related to
national security” refers to:
all intelligence, regardless of the source from which derived and
including information gathered within or outside the United States, that
(A) pertains, as determined consistent with any guidance issued by
the President, to more than one United States Government agency;
and
(B) that involves—
(i)
threats to the United States, its people, property, or interests;
(ii)
the development, proliferation, or use of weapons of mass destruction; or
76
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(iii)

any other matter bearing on United States national or homeland
security. 83

The Federal Information Security Management Act of 2002 (providing rules for
government-wide information security) similarly fails to consider the economic
underpinnings of national security, instead, understanding national security
systems as any system:
(i) the function, operation, or use of which
(I) involves intelligence activities;
(II) involves cryptologic activities related to national security;
(III) involves command and control of military forces;
(IV) involves equipment that is an integral part of a weapon or
weapons system; or
(V) subject to subparagraph (B), is critical to the direct fulfillment
of military or intelligence missions; or
(ii) is protected at all times by procedures established for information
that have been specifically authorized under criteria established by an
Executive order or an Act of Congress to be kept classified in the
interest of national defense or foreign policy. 84
While there may be room in the definition for economic considerations, they are
not front and center.
Executive Branch articulations are similarly unhelpful. President George W.
Bush’s five-page National Security Presidential Directive 1 referred to “national
security” thirty-three times, without any definition. 85 President Barak Obama’s
Presidential Policy Directive 1 (“PPD-1”), in turn, addressing the National Security
Council, referred to “national security” thirty-three times—without ever defining
it. 86 Like the Executive Branch, courts tend to look to the military and diplomatic
aspects of national security, instead of their economic concomitant. 87
Despite the lack of emphasis on economic strength in statutory definitions, the
Founders were well aware of the importance of the economy in fostering
international independence. The Articles of Confederation failed in significant
part because the national government lacked the resources, and the economic
strength, to protect the Union. For Alexander Hamilton, absent military might,
diplomatic stature, and commercial success, the country would cease to exist. 88
One of the first expansions of the executive, accordingly, was to include a
Secretary of the Treasury, which, along with the Secretary of War and the
establishment of the office of the Attorney General, reflected the purposes for
which Union had been sought: foreign relations, military strength, economic
growth, and the rule of law. 89 In his Farewell Address, President George
83
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Washington called for U.S. energies to be directed towards strengthening the U.S.
economy: “[T]he great rule of conduct for us in regard to foreign nations is in
extending our commercial relations, to have with them as little political connection
as possible.” 90
The federal government was willing, from a very early date, to act in support
of its commercial interests with whatever diplomatic, legal, and military power it
could muster. 91
History is telling. The Monroe Doctrine was premised largely on this
approach. 92 In 1837, President Martin Van Buren came to office determined to
continue Washington’s legacy, underscoring the importance of avoiding entangling
alliances while pursuing America’s economic interests abroad. 93 President
Zachary Taylor came to office in 1849 determined to continue the course,
emphasizing the importance of bolstering trade as a means of securing the
country. 94 The 1850 Clayton-Bulwer Treaty ensured that future canal access
through Central America would be open to international trade. 95
As Millard Fillmore succeeded Taylor, he considered commerce central to
U.S. interests abroad—for this reason, the Navy would require further resources to
protect trade along the Pacific Coast. 96 Upon taking office, President Franklin
Pierce reiterated the same policies: of the complicated European tumults and
anxieties, the United States was to be exempt, “But the vast interests of commerce
are common to all mankind, and the advantages of trade and international
intercourse must always present a noble field for the moral influence of a great
people.”
The United States went on to emphasize its dealings with Asia and to sign an
historic trade agreement with Japan.97 Expansionism, and the economic benefits it
brought, similarly proved central to U.S. national security. “Should [new
possessions] be obtained,” Pierce asserted during his Inaugural Address, “it will be
through no grasping spirit, but with a view to obvious national interest and
security, and in a manner entirely consistent with the strictest observance of
national faith.” From the 1898 Spanish-American War forward, the country
promoted its national interests through formative political, military, and economic
engagement in the international arena.
To the extent that the NSA programs, and public knowledge of them, has
harmed the U.S. economy, they have harmed U.S. national security. The country’s
economic strength is part of what enables the United States to respond to external
and internal threats. The ability to defend the country against would-be aggressors
requires resources—e.g., to build and equip a military force, to move troops, to
bin/ampage?collId=lljc&fileName=019/lljc019.db&recNum=137&itemLink=r%3Fammem%2Fhlaw
%3A%40field%28DOCID%2B%40lit%28jc0191%29%29%230190001&linkText=1)
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91 For a catalog of every military intervention in support of U.S. commercial interests, see WILLIAM
APPLEMAN WILLIAMS, EMPIRE AS A WAY OF LIFE: AN ESSAY ON THE CAUSES AND CHARACTER OF
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1980).
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respond to attacks in whatever form they may materialize. Many of the supplies
needed to fend off overreaching by either states or non-state actors derive not from
government production, but from the private sector. To the extent that a weak
private sector emerges, the government’s ability to respond is harmed.
Beyond this, economic security allows the country the freedom to determine
its international and domestic policies on the merits, not on need. Where the
United States is in a strong economic position, it is less vulnerable in international
negotiations, such as those related to trade. It is also in a politically superior
position, where it can use its wealth to accomplish the desired ends.
A strong economy also ensures that citizens have their needs met, with
sufficient income levels for housing, food, clothing, and education. This, in turn,
generates social and political stability, which allows for the development of
communities, which creates greater cohesion among citizens. It also contributes to
the evolution of democratic deliberations, reinforcing the rule of law.
Economic security allows for growth and innovation, which is fed by
education and opportunity. Innovation, in turn, allows the country to continue to
adapt to the evolving environment and international context. There are further
considerations. But these suffice to illustrate the importance of economic strength
to U.S. national security writ large.
High technology is central to the U.S. economy. A recent study by the Bay
Area Economic Council Institute sought to ascertain how important the high tech
industry is just for the U.S. labor market. It found that not only are high-tech jobs
critical for generating employment in other sectors, but that growth in the hightech sector has increasingly been happening in areas of great economic and
geographic diversity, suggesting that the high-tech industry is not limited to one
ethic, social, or economic strata.
High-technology has been one of the fastest-growing sectors: between 2004
and 2012, the employment growth in high-tech outpaced private sector growth by a
ratio of 3:1. Jobs in Science, Technology, Engineering, and Mathematics (STEM)
outpaced job gains across all occupations by a ratio of 27:1. 98 Employment
predictions put the demand for high-tech workers to increase 16.2% 2011 to 2020,
with STEM employment increasing 13.3% during the same period. 99
The study found that the generation of jobs in high-technology had farreaching effects. In addition to the income gains generated by innovation,
productivity and a global marketplace, high-technology industrial growth
generated other types of jobs. Health care, education, law, restaurants, hotels and
personal services, as well as goods-producing construction sectors grew in tandem
with high tech, largely because of a local multiplier effect: “For each job created in
the local high-tech sector,” the study concluded, “approximately 4.3 jobs are
created in the local non-tradable sector in the long run.” 100
Even as early as 2002, the National Science Foundation found that the global
market for high-technology goods is growing at a swifter rate than for other
manufactured goods. More than this, “high-technology industries are driving
economic growth around the world.” 101
98 Bay Area Council Economic Institute Report, Technology Works: High-Tech Employment and
Wages in the United States, Dec. 2012, p. 5,
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101 Industry, Technology, and the Global Marketplace, 2002,
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This study built on one released in 1995 by the National Academies, which
had looked carefully at the role and importance of high tech companies in the U.S.
economy. 102
Indeed, study after study reflects the importance of high-technology in the U.S.
economy. In 2015, a Brookings study found that “advanced industries” (which
include high-technology, STEM, and industries, like aerospace, which are heavily
dependent on advanced technologies), “represent a sizable economic anchor for the
U.S. economy.” 103 They led the post-recession recovery. Brookings found that
with only 9 percent of the total U.S. employment, advanced industries produce
some $2.7 trillion per year—around 17% of the country’s GDP. Further, about 60
percent of U.S. exports are tied to this sector, with 2.2 jobs being created
domestically for every new advanced industry job. In sum, “Directly and
indirectly. . . the sector supports almost 39 million jobs—nearly one-fourth of all
U.S. employment.” 104
B. National Security Infrastructure
The National Security Council (“NSC”) is “the principal forum for
consideration of national security policy issues requiring Presidential
determination.” 105 The President looks to the forum for advice and assistance in
matters ranging from domestic, foreign and military, to intelligence and
economic. 106
It is thus somewhat surprising that the 1947 National Security Act includes
neither the Secretary of the Treasury, nor the Secretary of Commerce, as
permanent (statutory) members of the NSC. Instead, the entity is chaired by the
President, with formal membership extended to the Vice President, the Secretary
of State, and the Secretary of Defense.107 The Chair of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
acts as the statutory military advisor, the Director of National Intelligence as the
statutory intelligence advisor, and the Director of National Drug Control Policy as
the statutory drug control policy advisor. 108
Under PDD-1, the NSC includes the Secretary of Treasury, and “[w]hen
international economic issues are on the agenda of the NSC, the NSC’s regular
attendees will include the Secretary of Commerce, the United States Trade
Representative, the Assistant to the President for Economic Policy, and the Chair
of the Council of Economic Advisers.” 109
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When the emphasis is not international economic issues, the structure does not
cement economic concerns into the discussion. Nor does it contemplate the
inclusion of Treasury or Commerce as an operational matter—i.e., when the
intelligence community is deciding whether to develop a surveillance program.
Such matters are not brought directly to the NSC. 110
To the extent that the failure to include these members at the most basic level
reflects a perspective that potentially sidelines economic concerns, the continued
failure to build in strong representation at a programmatic level underscores the
concern. Economic concerns may be treated with seriousness, but they are not
meaningfully integrated into the national security infrastructure.
C. Unintended Harmful Consequences
There are various ways in which the NSA’s apparent failure to take account of
the potential impact of public knowledge of the programs on U.S. industry may
have acted to undermine U.S. security beyond weakening the economy. The
backlash risks shielding foreign government actions from public scrutiny. It
potentially undermines the ability of the United States to develop international
norms against ubiquitous surveillance, which can be used for political or economic
espionage. And it raises the possibility that the country will lose digital sight of
active threats against the United States.
As was previously noted, the data localization movement, given momentum by
the NSA revelations, risks the creation of distinct, parallel Internets, which would
stifle the free flow of information that connects not just economies, but cultures
and people, with potential rollbacks for an increasingly globalized world. This
would affect the country’s interest in democratic engagement and it would harm
the United States’ international reach. The creation of national search engines,
national email systems, and national social networks, moreover, means that foreign
governments will have direct control over electronic communication networks,
facilitating censorship and domestic surveillance and limiting outside view of the
extent to which such steps are being taken.
When Turkish Prime Minister Recep Erdoğan, for instance, tried to shut town
Twitter, the international community was immediately put on notice. 111
#TwitterisblockedinTurkey #dictatorerdogan, and #occupytwitter quickly moved
to popular trending topics internationally. 112 The United States, EU, and others
formally objected to the action through diplomatic channels. Had Turkey been an
isolated network, it may have secretly censored the politically damaging
information (in this case, leaks revealing corruption in the Erdoğan government),
without generating such immediate, international attention.
Along the same lines, in July 2014 President Vladimir Putin signed a new law
requiring Internet companies to store all Russian users’ data within domestic
borders. Russia’s media and parliament members have used Edward Snowden’s
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leaks about NSA spying to rally support for the new law. 113 The legislation,
though, serves to intensify Putin’s control over Internet companies. 114 With
internal data centers, it will be easier for the Russian president to enforce
censorship policies and to collect information about members of the political
opposition. The law could also give Putin an excuse to shut down major social
media networks if they fail to comply with the new regulations.
The NSA revelations also have undermined U.S. credibility in challenging
other countries’ efforts to obtain trade secrets and other information through state
surveillance. China provides one of the strongest examples. Because of the NSA
programs, U.S. objections to China selling surveillance technology to oppressive
regimes look rather weak. Post-Snowden, Chinese efforts have become even more
public and devastating to U.S. interests.
Since 2005, when President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad first took office, Iran has
stated its plan to develop a national Internet network. 115 In the intervening decade,
the country has been unable to do so. But in January 2014 Iran’s Ministry of
Communications and Information Technology announced that China would
officially be collaborating with them on the creation of the National Information
Network. 116 Part of Iran’s aim has been to develop a system that allows the
country to turn off the international components of the Internet, in a way that will
enable the government and domestic banking industry to continue to operate. With
more than half the population under age 35, Iran has a tech-savvy citizenry, which
has, to date, found various ways around government efforts to block social media
and other international sources. It is not clear whether Iran will be able to
completely divest itself of access to the world wide web. What is clear is that in a
post-Snowden era, their efforts to do so are being facilitated by countries with
interests diametrically opposed to the United States.
Online warfare between China and the United States simmered in the
background, until in early 2013 the Obama Administration began to make it center
stage. In January 2013, the New York Times reported that Chinese hackers had
infiltrated its computers following a threat that if the paper insisted on publishing a
story about its prime minister, consequences would follow. 117 The following
month, a security firm, Mandiant, revealed that the Chinese military unit 61398
had stolen data from U.S. companies and agencies. 118 In March 2013 President
Obama’s national security advisor publicly urged China to reduce its surveillance
efforts—after which classified documents leaked to the public demonstrated the
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extent to which China had infiltrated U.S. government servers. 119 In May 2013,
the National Security Advisor flew to China to lay the groundwork for a summit,
in which cyber surveillance would prove center stage. 120 Two days before the
Obama-Xi meeting was scheduled to take place, The Guardian ran the first story
on the NSA programs. 121 On June 7, when Obama raised the question of Chinese
espionage, Xi responded by quoting the Guardian and suggesting that the U.S.
should not be lecturing the Chinese about surveillance. 122 Although differences
may mark the two countries’ approaches to surveillance (e.g., in one case for
economic advantage, in the other for political or security advantage), the broader
translation for the global community has been one in which the United States has
lost high ground to try to restrict cyber-surveillance.
A final point is worth noting in this context: namely, to the extent that nonU.S. companies are picking up customers and business overseas, the United States’
ability to conduct surveillance may be further harmed—thus going directly to the
country’s national security interests. In other words, it may be in the country’s
best interests to keep traffic routed through U.S. companies, which would allow
the national security infrastructure, with appropriate legal process, to access the
information in question. The apparent overreach of the NSA, however, may end
up driving much of the traffic elsewhere, making it harder for the United States to
obtain the information needed to protect the country against foreign threats.
IV. STEPS REQUIRED TO REDRESS THE CURRENT SITUATION
Numerous steps could be taken by Congress to address the situation in which U.S.
industry currently finds itself. The most effective and influential decision that
legislators could take would be to curb the NSA’s authorities under the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Act. This action has two components: first, ending the
telephony metadata collection program and, second, restricting the use of to/from,
or about collection under upstream interceptions. Both programs would further
benefit from greater transparency, to make it clear that their aim is to prevent
foreign aggression and to prevent threats to U.S. national security—not to engage
in the interception of trade secrets or to build dossiers on other countries’
populations.
The second most effective change that could be undertaken would be to
introduce stricter privacy controls on U.S. companies, in the process bringing the
United States into closer line with the principles that dominate in the EU. The two
entities are not as far apart as the dialogue might have one assume, and so changes
required in this sphere would be minimal. Together, these two alterations—
curbing the NSA surveillance programs and providing increased consumer
protections for privacy—would allow U.S. industry to argue changed
circumstances to allow companies to again become competitive for contracts and
markets to which they seek access.
A third alteration that would make a substantial difference over the longer term
relates to the national security infrastructure. The current failure of the United
States to integrate economic concerns creates a vulnerability for the country in
terms of the breadth and depth of programs subsequently adopted. New thought
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needs to be given on how to take on board—and mitigate—potentially devastating
economic consequences of government surveillance efforts.
A. FISA Alterations
In addition to the economic impact of NSA telephony metadata collection
(discussed, infra), the program runs contrary to Congressional intent in introducing
the FISA, contradicts the statutory language, and violates the Fourth
Amendment. 123 In 2014, the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board came to
a similar conclusion, 124 as did the President’s own appointed Review Group,
charged with considering the telephony metadata collection program, in 2013. 125
Accordingly, the President announced on January 17, 2014 that he was
“ordering a transition that will end the Section 215 bulk metadata program as it
currently exists, and establish a mechanism that preserves the capabilities we need
without the government holding this bulk metadata.” 126 The alternative approach
was to be developed by March 28, 2014. Nine months later, on September 13,
2014, the FISC approved the Department of Justices’s (“DOJ”) request to extend
the program for another 90 days—without any transition program in place. More
than a year after the announcement, a new program has yet to be put into place.
The President issued a new presidential directive for U.S. signals intelligence
activities, both at home and abroad. The classified nature of parts of the document,
international skepticism about the Administration’s commitment to privacy, and
the failure of the Administration to make good on its promise of transition to a new
program meant that the global community, with good reason, has questioned
whether anything has really changed.
As a matter of Section 702 and the interception of international content,
PRISM and upstream collection present global concerns—neither of which have
been addressed through any legislative change. The existence of these programs,
while perhaps statutorily consistent with the FISA Amendments Act, as well as
constitutionally sufficient with regard to the interception of non-U.S. persons
communications, where the individual is reasonably believed to be located outside
the United States, as a policy matter, goes some way towards undermining
international confidence in U.S. companies.
The Fourth Amendment does not reach non-U.S. persons based overseas who
lack a substantial connection to the United States. 127 Writing for the Court in
United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, Chief Justice Rehnquist concluded that “the
people” referred to in the Fourth Amendment indicate a particular group—not
merely people qua people. 128 His reading stems from a deeply Aristotelian
approach: i.e., one that emphasizes membership in the political community as a
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concomitant of forming a structure of government. 129 As members of the polis,
U.S. persons, both distributively and collectively, obtain the protections of the
Constitution.
Viewed in this regard, the Constitution itself embodies the collective
organization of “the people” into one entity. “U.S. persons” and “the people” are,
therefore, one and the same. The “right of the people” thus refers to a collective
group of individuals “who are part of a national community or who have otherwise
developed sufficient connection with this country to be considered part of that
community.” 130
Very few cases address precisely what constitutes sufficient contact with the
United States to satisfy the “substantial connections” aspect of the majority’s
decision. Those that do point in seemingly different directions. 131 At a minimum,
however, it would be extraordinary to assume that simply because an individual
uses a U.S. company, he or she thereby gains the protections of the Fourth
Amendment. This was the basic argument underlying the “modernization” of
FISA in the first place, to take account of bad actors, communicating overseas,
who would suddenly fall within the more protective FISA regime merely because
their communications happened to come within U.S. territory by nature of the
carrier in question.
Even recognizing, however, that few constitutional barriers may apply to the
programmatic use of Section 702 insofar as it is applied to non-U.S. persons
(leaving aside the questions that accompany the incidental collection of U.S.
persons’ information, as well as entirely domestic conversations), as a matter of
policy, certainly both PRISM and the use of to/from or about collection in
upstream gathering has dramatically undermined U.S. industry. As a matter of
policy, therefore, greater restrictions, more transparency, and more effective
oversight of the international collection of content may help to alter the situation
with regard to the skepticism expressed towards U.S. companies.
The Obama Administration has begun to take steps to acknowledge the
importance of data privacy for European citizens, but steps have thus far been
limited to law enforcement, excluding surveillance conducted for national security
purposes. In June 2014, Attorney General Eric Holder announced that, as part of
the EU-U.S. Data Protection and Privacy Agreement, the Administration would
work with Congress to provide EU citizens the ability to seek redress in U.S.
courts where personal data, shared with the United States by European countries
for law enforcement purposes is subsequently intentionally or willfully
disclosed. 132 The Office of the Director of National Intelligence claims this action
as part of the privacy-protective measures implemented in the wake of the
Snowden disclosures. 133 The agreement, however, is limited to information
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provided by European countries, making it somewhat beside the point. More
relevantly, the Administration supported the USA FREEDOM Act, which would
have prohibited the bulk collection of telephony metadata under Section 215 of the
USA PATRIOT Act (as well as the Pen Registers and Trap and Trace provisions of
FISA and National Security Letters, which appear in five parts of the U.S. Code).
Congress, however, failed to pass the USA FREDOM Act. Actions taken with
regard to Section 702 have been minimal and generally focused on U.S. persons.
B. Privacy Law Harmonization
Much ink has been spilled on the cultural and practical differences between the
United States and the EU with regard to data protection and privacy law. These
differences have been over-blown.
There are myriad ways in which the two regions reflect a similar approach.
Just as the United States’ Fourth Amendment protects the right to privacy, for
instance, Article 8 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights
and Fundamental Freedoms embraces the same. 134 These documents
constitutionally ground two fundamental liberty interests in their respective
regions’ governing frameworks: (a) the right to privacy, and (b) freedom from
arbitrary invasion of one’s private sphere. 135 In the European Union, these liberties
are supported by EU-wide directives, such as the 1995 European Data Protection
Directive and the EU Internet Privacy Law of 2002. 136 Further, in both the EU and
the U.S. such liberty interests are protected through national legislation, in which a
judicial remedy is provided for a breach of the right to privacy. 137 The manner in
countries to the right to seek judicial redress for intentional or willful disclosures of protected
information, and for refusal to grant access or to rectify any errors in that information.”)
134 Compare U.S. CONST., amend. IV ("The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
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which these rights are treated is similarly consistent. In both spheres, these rights
are offset against the obligations owed by the data holder to the individual to
whom the information relates. 138
As a substantive matter, the two regions have adopted similar provisions. In
the EU and the U.S., for instance, heightened protections are provided for what is
known as personally-identifiable information. 139 A series of exceptions to the
dominant structure is provided in two central areas: security (including, e.g.,
criminal law, public security, defense, and national security) and freedom of
expression (such as with regard to journalism, literary pursuits, artistic expression,
and political opinions). 140 To ensure that the substantive measures reflect the
underlying constitutional principles, both regions insist on minimization—i.e., that
the information collected on individuals be limited to what is strictly necessary for
the purposes delineated by statute. 141
Both the U.S. and the EU have established a set of substantive requirements
related to individuals’ knowledge that data about them is being collected, stored,
and possibly shared with others. Consent, for instance, is central to both
systems. 142
Much has been made in regard to the distinction between the opt-in (European
approach) versus the opt-out (American approach). 143 What has been lost,
however, is that both approaches rely on the consent of the subject (subject to
specific exceptions, above), in order to proceed with data gathering, analysis, and
distribution. To facilitate this structure, both regions also require that notice be
provided to targets and that individuals have the right to access information that is
held about them. 144 Individuals, in both systems, have the right to object to
particular information, and in both systems, the data holder has a duty to ensure
that the information is accurate and kept up to date. 145
Keeping in mind the consistencies between the two systems, and the benefits
to be gained for U.S. industry from emphasizing harmony, there are two areas
where the regions differ that could be addressed through legislative reform:,
recognition of residual rights in third party data, and the creation of a
U.S.C.) (2012), Video Privacy Protection Act of 1988 18 U.S.C. § 2710 (2012), and the Health
Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. 104-191, 110 Stat. (codified as
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comprehensive, privacy-protective regime, as opposed to the piecemeal approach
that currently marks U.S. law.
1. Residual Rights in Third Party Data
One central question that divides the United States from numerous other
countries and regions—including the European Union—centers on who owns an
individual’s data. In the United States, since Smith v. Maryland (addressing pen
registers and trap and trace devices), and U.S. v. Miller (focusing on financial
records), all three branches have treated information held by third parties as
lacking an individual right to privacy. 146
In contrast, the EU considers that the individual who has provided data to a
third party to still have a privacy interest in the information. 147 The recent
European Court decision, recognizing the right to anonymity, necessarily
presupposes a continued interest in data, even once it is obtained by a third
party. 148
The difference between the approaches is central to understanding how new
technologies, such as social network analysis, cloud computing, and data mining,
have deepened the privacy interests implicated in third party handling of data.
New technologies allow information to be generated about which, even those to
whom the data relates are unaware. To say that individuals do not have a
reasonable expectation of privacy in this information rather flies in the face of
common sense.
The Supreme Court appears to be coming to this conclusion as well. In United
States v. Jones, the Court considered a case involving 28-day surveillance
involving the placement of a GPS chip on a vehicle. 149 Although ultimately
decided on grounds of trespass, a shadow majority expressed strong concern about
the implications of long-term surveillance. Justice Alito, joined by Justice Ginsburg,
Justice Breyer, and Justice Kagan, suggested that in most criminal investigations,
long-term monitoring “impinges on expectations of privacy.” 150 The nature of new
technologies mattered:
Recent years have seen the emergence of many new devices that permit
the monitoring of a person’s movements. In some locales, closed-circuit
television video monitoring is becoming ubiquitous. On toll roads,
automatic toll collection systems create a precise record of the
movements of motorists who choose to make use of their convenience.
Many motorists purchase cars that are equipped with devices that permit a
central station to ascertain the car’s location at any time so that roadside
assistance may be provided if needed and the car may be found if it is
stolen. 151
Justice Sotomayor went one step further, calling into question the entire basis
for the third party doctrine. Specifically, in light of the level of intrusiveness
represented by modern technology, “it may be necessary to reconsider the premise
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that an individual has no reasonable expectation of privacy in information
voluntarily disclosed to third parties.” 152 Sotomayor pointed out:
This approach is ill suited to the digital age, in which people reveal a
great deal of information about themselves to third parties in the course of
carrying out mundane tasks. People disclose the phone numbers that they
dial or text to the cellular providers; the URLs that they visit and the email addresses with which they correspond to their Internet service
providers; and the books, groceries, and medications they purchase to
online retailers. 153
She continued, “I would not assume that all information voluntarily disclosed to
some member of the public for a limited purpose is, for that reason alone,
disentitled to Fourth Amendment protection.” 154
Congress has an opportunity to take the lead by recognizing the right to
privacy still held by data holders when information is collected by third parties. It
can then craft statutes accordingly, ensuring that U.S. companies offer greater
protections for consumers, in the process allowing industry to offset the claims of
its overseas competitors.
2. Legal Framework
Thus far, U.S. high technology companies have been subject to a very different
statutory and regulatory structure than that which prevails in the EU. In the United
States, privacy rights have largely been protected via a series of vertical statutes
dealing with specific areas, such as children using the Internet, driver-related
information, and medical data. 155
In the EU, in contrast, privacy has been protected by a more omnibus-type
approach, which horizontally reaches across a number of areas. This approach is
reflected in the 1995 Directive as well as the national legislation implementing the
directive on a country-by-country basis. 156
The vertical statutory scheme has been successful in addressing particular,
discreet areas where privacy interests reside. However, outside of these narrow
exceptions, in the interests of encouraging innovation, the high technology sector
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has been left largely unregulated by federal statute. The assumption has been that
market forces would adjust to protect privacy interests.
The advantage of this approach has been to give high tech companies a
significant amount of flexibility, allowing them to independently gauge the
appropriate level of privacy protections to give to consumers.
The drawback has been that privacy itself has become commoditized, with
companies actually making money off of selling consumers’ privacy interests.
Consider Google and its email service, Gmail, for instance. The company reads
and analyzes all of its customers’ emails, it watches what people read, it looks at
web sites people visit, and it records what people purchase. The company then
sells access to customers’ private lives to companies who want to advertise. 157
Thus, the mother who sends an email to her son raising concern about depression
may receive an ad within hours for psychiatric services, even as a pregnant woman
merely looking at cribs, may within days receive mail through the U.S. post,
advertising sales at Babies R’Us.
In September 2013, Google lost an effort in the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals
for judicial review of a lower court’s refusal to dismiss multiple class action
lawsuits accusing Google of violating the Wiretap Act. 158 United States District
Judge Lucy Koh determined that the case was too far along to suffer delays. 159
Koh’s interpretation of the Electronic Communications Privacy Act limits the
“ordinary course of business” exception—not least because Google’s practice
violates its own policies. 160 The lawsuits, filed in California, Florida, Illinois,
Maryland, and Pennsylvania, at great expense, are ongoing.
Capitalizing on private data represents a significant breach of the right to
privacy. Instead of protecting privacy, the market has exploited it for monetary
gain. In the United States and overseas, individuals are concerned about the lack
of protections afforded. Congressional legislation could fix this problem by
bringing high technology within the broader statutory framework and thus closing
a gap in the existing law.
3. Safe Harbor Considerations
In the wake of the Snowden revelations, the EU Commission issued a report
recommending the retention of Safe Harbor, but recommending significant
changes, including required disclosure of cloud computing and other service
provider contracts used by Safe Harbor members. 161
The Safe Harbor provisions, developed from 1999 to 2000 by the U.S.
Commerce Department, the Article 31 Committee on Data Privacy, and the
European Union, created a narrow bridge between the United States and EU. At
the time, the European Parliament, which did not bind the European Commission,
rejected the Safe Harbor provisions by a vote of 279 to 259, with twenty-two
abstentions. Chief amongst European concerns was the failure of the agreement to
provide adequate protections.
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In light of the massive data breaches over the past five years in the United
States, the practices of a largely unregulated high technology industry, and the
ubiquitous nature of NSA surveillance, Europeans are now even less supportive of
the Safe Harbor provisions. 162 They amount to a self-regulated scheme in which
the U.S. Federal Trade Commission looks at whether a company, which has
voluntarily opted-in to the program, fails to do what it has stated it will do, within
the bounds of its own privacy policy. 163 Stronger measures are necessary to restore
European confidence in U.S. high technology companies.
C. Establishing Economic Security as National Security
Economic strength as national security, as was previously discussed, is not a
new concept. The Founding itself was premised, in part, on the importance of
economic security as being vital to U.S. national interests. In 1787, the Articles of
Confederation were written out of existence on economic security grounds, as the
country sought to reassure the international community that it was a viable trading
partner. 164 Since that time, the United States has at times had to remind itself of
the importance of the economy to U.S. national interests. We are once again at
such a moment.
High technology is a vital part of the U.S. economy. It is a symbolic and
actual manifestation of the country’s commitment to innovation in every sphere of
life. It plays to the United States’ strengths as a nation. It has the potential to
change regimes, to alter political relationships, and to shape the daily lives of
people around the globe. And it deserves special attention. The danger is that U.S.
industry will become less competitive and that the U.S. will lose its dominance in
the Internet sphere.
To some extent, we do, structurally, pay some attention to the importance of
the economy for U.S. national security. But many consequential decisions are not
aired in full light of the possible implications for U.S. economic interests. 165 One
way Congress could rectify this would be to take a look at how to integrate
economic concerns, as an institutional matter, into the national security
infrastructure—and not just at the highest levels, but at a programmatic level,
where key decisions about programs are being made.
V. CONCLUDING REMARKS
The Snowden documents revealed not just the extent to which high technology
companies had been coopted or compromised, but also that the targets of NSA

162 See, European Parliament resolution of 12 March 2014 on the US NSA surveillance programme,
surveillance bodies in various Member States and their impact on EU citizens’ fundamental rights
and on transatlantic cooperation in Justice and Home Affairs (2013/2188(INI)), available at:
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=TA&language=EN&reference=P7-TA-20140230 (“Takes the view that, as under the current circumstances the Safe Harbour principles do not
provide adequate protection for EU citizens”).
163 See Safe Harbor Privacy Principles, U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE (July 21, 2000),
http://www.export.gov/safeharbor/eu/eg_main_018475.asp.
164 See THE FEDERAL NO. 11 (Alexander Hamilton) (“The speculative trader will at once perceive the
force of these observations, and will acknowledge that the aggregate balance of the commerce of the
United States would bid fair to be much more favorable than that of the thirteen States without union
or with partial unions.”
165 See In re Google Inc., supra note 142.
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surveillance include allied and non-allied countries. 166 The impact of this
information has meant that U.S. companies have lost revenues and experienced
declining market share.
Simultaneously, the United States’ position in
international trade negotiations has been weakened. The NSA programs also
spurred other countries’ efforts to implement data localization. Jurisdictional
questions and national borders previously marked the worldwide Internet
discussions. 167 But countries are using the NSA programs to justify restricting data
storage to national borders, making it more difficult for the United States to gain
access. 168 The backlash has led some commentators to raise concern that “the
Internet will never be the same.” 169 At risk is the balkanization of the Internet,
undermining its traditional culture of open access, and increasing the cost of doing
business. 170
By undermining high technology companies, U.S. economic security—which
is central to U.S. national security—is at risk. Part of the problem appears to be
that the national security institutional structure has failed to adequately reflect the
importance of economic concerns. Beyond this, there have been a number of
unintended consequences even within spheres traditionally understood as within a
national security realm.
To redress the negative effects that have followed from public awareness of
the NSA programs conducted under Section 215 of the USA PATRIOT Act and
Section 702 of the FISA Amendments Act, the most important step that Congress
could take would be to reign in the surveillance authorities themselves, in the
process providing greater transparency and oversight. An alteration in U.S.
privacy law would also help to reassure U.S. customers and individuals located
outside domestic bounds that consumer privacy is protected, allowing industry
accurately to claim that the circumstances have changed. Consideration of how to
integrate economic concerns into the national security infrastructure would further
help to emphasize the importance of taking account of the impact of new initiatives
on the United States.
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